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INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 2009, President George W. Bush commuted the
prison sentences of two Border Patrol agents.1 The agents were
convicted of shooting and wounding a drug smuggler who had
attempted to escape arrest and flee to Mexico.2 The two agents,
Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean, were convicted not only of
assault and related charges but also of violating what is commonly
referred to as § 924(c), a federal statute that imposes a mandatory
minimum sentence for involvement of a firearm in a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime.3 Although the President believed
the agents “deserved to be punished,” he also believed the sentences, which exceeded ten years, were excessive.4
Agents Ramos and Compean’s prosecution sparked outrage
among members of Congress.5 Their anger was not solely because
the agents were prosecuted for shooting a drug smuggler while
attempting to arrest him; such prosecutions are not unheard of.6
What sparked much of the outrage in Ramos and Compean’s case
was the fact that, beyond charges for assault and denial of civil
rights, the agents were additionally charged under § 924(c), which
carried a mandatory ten-year sentence.7
Although this prosecution brought the issue of § 924(c) charges
against police officers to the forefront, numerous officers have been
charged under the statute. When § 924(c) was originally enacted,
police officers were exempt from punishment under the statute
1. See Todd J. Gillman & Laura Isensee, Bush Frees Border Agents: Sentences
Commuted but Conviction Stands for Shooting Smuggler, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 20,
2009, at 1A.
2. See infra Part II.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
4. Gillman & Isensee, supra note 1, at 1A (quoting a “White House official”).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. In 2008, a Border Patrol agent was tried twice, resulting in two hung juries, for
fatally shooting an illegal immigrant while the victim, depending on the testimony believed,
was either on his knees surrendering or attempting to crush the agent’s skull with a rock.
See Josh Brodesky, Jurors Can’t Reach Verdict in Killing by Border Agent, ARIZ. DAILY STAR,
Mar. 8, 2008, at A1 (first trial); Brady McCombs, Border Agent’s Retrial Another Mistrial,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
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when they carried a firearm during a felony, but could be punished
if they used a firearm, for instance by firing it.8 Later, § 924(c) was
amended to remove any exemption for police officers.
This Note proposes that Congress exempt police officers from
§ 924(c) if two conditions are met. First, at the time the underlying
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime occurs, the officer must
be authorized to carry the firearm either by the local law enforcement agency or by federal statute. Second, the officer must be
acting in the performance of his duties. The exemption would apply
both to carrying and using a firearm.
Part I outlines the history of § 924(c) and the evidentiary
requirements for conviction. Part II analyzes Ramos and Compean’s
prosecution, their appeal, and the congressional and public reaction.
Part III outlines this Note’s proposal—an altered version of § 924(c).
Part IV gives justifications for why police should receive an
exemption. Part V answers criticisms of this Note’s proposed
exemption. Part VI briefly discusses possible corollary arguments
applicable to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
I. SECTION 924(c)
A. History of the Statute
In 1968, Congress debated an amendment to a gun control bill
that would punish those who committed crimes with firearms.9 The
amendment’s original language imposed a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence on anyone who used or carried a firearm while
committing certain enumerated crimes.10 The amendment’s purpose
was to “persuade the criminal to leave his gun at home.”11
During floor debate, some representatives expressed concern that
the amendment would apply to police officers who commit a felony
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See 114 CONG. REC. 21,765-66 (1968); see also United States v. Howard, 504 F.2d
1281, 1286 (8th Cir. 1974) (outlining the legislative history of § 924(c)).
10. See 114 CONG. REC. 21,063 (1968).
11. Id. at 22,244 (statement of Rep. Randall). The proposal “would affect no one but the
criminal, particularly the hardened repeat offender, who, like a mad dog, has proven in
recent years he cannot be permitted to run amok in society.” Id. at 21,061 (statement of Rep.
Casey).
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while carrying their firearm.12 One representative asked whether
an officer could be subject to prosecution if “a policeman carrying a
gun, as policemen do, were to slap somebody and it were found that
he was not justified in doing so.”13 Another representative raised
concerns about an officer who pushed someone improperly “in the
course of a sudden dispute.”14
The amendment’s sponsor agreed that these hypothetical
situations were problematic.15 Congress passed a modified version
of the amendment, which exempted police officers and those with
licensed firearms from punishment for carrying a firearm during a
felony. The statute, known as § 924(c), imposed a sentence between
one and ten years on anyone who used a firearm to commit a felony
or who unlawfully carried a firearm while committing a felony.16
Police officers were therefore exempt when they committed a felony
while carrying a gun; no exemption was given for using a gun.
In 1984, Congress deleted “unlawfully” from § 924(c) and changed
the underlying offense from “any felony” to any “crime of violence.”17
In a footnote, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s report
explained the deletion of “unlawfully.”18 According to the report, a
police officer who commits a crime with a firearm should be
punished the same as a person not legally authorized to carry a

12. See United States v. Ramirez, 482 F.2d 807, 814 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation omitted)
(discussing the legislative debate concerning charging police officers).
13. 114 CONG. REC. 21,788 (1968) (statement of Rep. Yates).
14. Id. at 21,789 (statement of Rep. Scheuer).
15. Id. at 21,792 (statement of Rep. Casey). Representative Casey asked his colleagues
to “get after these fellows who continue to be turned loose over and over again to commit
crime .... We are not after all these exceptions, all the incidents you talk about, like ... [h]e
had a permit to carry a pistol ... gets angry and pushes someone else.” Id. These hypothetical
cases were concerned with an officer carrying a gun, not using a gun.
16. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 924, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224. Since 1971,
sentences under § 924(c) are served consecutively. See Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 13, 84 Stat. 1880, 1889-90 (1971).
17. Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138-39 (1984).
A “crime of violence” is defined as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or ... involves
a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (2006).
18. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 314 n.10 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492.
This report accompanied the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which the Senate
passed in 1984 and was the basis for the language in the appropriations bill. 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
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firearm.19 Because the amended § 924(c) included a requirement
that the firearm be used or carried “during and in relation to any
crime of violence,” the report described the “unlawfully” language
as unnecessary; the new language would shield a situation such as
“a pugilistic barroom fight” when the gun is “carried in a pocket and
never displayed or referred to,” because “the weapon played no part
in the crime.”20 In 1986, drug trafficking was added as an underlying crime.21
In 1998, Congress passed the current version of § 924(c), which
added the possession of a firearm as a basis for prosecution.22 The
current statute punishes anyone “who, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a
firearm” or “in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm.”23
There are three possible minimum sentences: five years (the
default sentence), seven years (if the firearm is brandished), and
ten years (if the firearm is discharged).24 Second and subsequent
convictions result in mandatory minimum sentences of twenty-five
years.25 The sentences are served consecutively;26 that is, they are
served after the sentences received for the underlying crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime.
B. Proving the Elements of § 924(c)
To prove possession “in furtherance” of the underlying crime,
more than the mere presence of the firearm must be established.27
19. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 314 n.10 (“[P]ersons who are licensed to carry firearms and
abuse that privilege by committing a crime with the weapon, as in the extremely rare case
of the armed police officer who commits a crime, are ... deserving of punishment.”).
20. Id.
21. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 449, 456-57
(1986).
22. Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469-70 (1998); see also Angela LaBuda Collins,
Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Congressional Reaction to the Supreme
Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1319, 1347-48 (1999) (discussing the
legislative history behind the current § 924(c)).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C).
26. Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
27. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
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The government must show “that the firearm was possessed to
advance or promote the criminal activity.”28 Factors considered to
determine whether the possession furthered the underlying crime
include “whether the weapon is stolen” and “the status of the
possession (legitimate or illegal).”29
To prove that the defendant carried the firearm “during and in
relation to” the underlying crime, the government must “establish
a nexus between the carriage of the firearm and the underlying
offense.”30 The defendant must have “intended the weapon to be
available for use” during the underlying crime.31 Further, “the
presence and availability of a weapon permits a jury to infer an
intent to use the weapon should there be an ‘evident need.’”32
To prove that the defendant used the firearm, the government
must show “active employment” of the firearm.33 This can be
established by showing that the firearm was brandished or
discharged.34
II. AGENTS RAMOS AND COMPEAN
The current version of § 924(c) allows a prosecutor to bring
charges against police officers for their firearms’ involvement in
drug crimes or violent encounters with civilians. The trial of Agents
Ramos and Compean brought public attention to this issue. This
Part outlines the altercation, the trial, the appeal, and the subsequent congressional and public reaction.
A. The Altercation, Trial, and Appeal
On February 17, 2005, Border Patrol Agent Jose Compean, on
patrol near Fabens, Texas, received an alert that a sensor at the
28. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 11-12 (1997).
29. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415; accord United States v. Frederick, 406 F.3d 754, 763
(6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
30. United States v. Shuler, 181 F.3d 1188, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing United States
v. Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1241 (10th Cir. 1997)).
31. Id. at 1190 (citing United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1548 (10th Cir. 1996)).
32. United States v. Coyle, 998 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
33. See United States v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995).
34. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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U.S.-Mexican border had been activated.35 Another agent saw a van
driving near the area of the sensor and began to pursue it.36 Driving
the van was Oswaldo Aldrete-Davila, who had illegally entered the
United States from Mexico to smuggle 743 pounds of marijuana.37
Aldrete-Davila sped away from the agents, starting a high speed
chase.38 Aldrete-Davila eventually crashed his van into a ditch
near the border, jumped out, and ran toward Mexico.39 Compean,
shotgun in hand, was waiting on the other side of a levee that stood
between Aldrete-Davila and his escape to Mexico.40
What happened next was disputed at trial. Compean testified
that he struggled with Aldrete-Davila, during which Aldrete-Davila
threw dirt in Compean’s face and ran toward Mexico.41 Compean
claimed that while Aldrete-Davila was running, Aldrete-Davila
turned to look back at him and had something in his hand.42
Compean opened fire at Aldrete-Davila with his service handgun,
firing one magazine, switching it for a new one, and firing a few
more shots—all of which missed.43
On the other hand, Aldrete-Davila testified that Compean fell
down the ditch after losing his balance while trying to hit him with
the shotgun.44 Aldrete-Davila claimed he never turned back to look
at Compean while running away nor had anything in his hand.45
Agent Ignacio Ramos arrived on the scene shortly before the
altercation between Compean and Aldrete-Davila. Ramos ran
35. United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1615 (2009).
36. Id.
37. Miguel Bustillo, Agents Get Prison for Wounding a Smuggler, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2006, at 1.
38. Ramos, 537 F.3d at 444.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 444-45.
41. Id. at 445.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Aldrete-Davila testified that after he told Compean, “Take it easy man. Don’t hit
me,” Compean responded, “Stop, you shit Mexican.” 7 Transcript of Record at 106, United
States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-CR-856-K6), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/txw/press_releases/Compean-Ramos/index.html [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
Compean denied the exchange. Id. at 83. Agent Juarez, who was on the scene, corroborated
Aldrete-Davila’s account of the struggle at trial. Ramos, 537 F.3d at 445.
45. Ramos, 537 F.3d at 445.
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toward the levee and heard shots fired.46 He reached the top of the
levee, saw Compean on the ground and Aldrete-Davila running with
something in his hand, and shot once at Aldrete-Davila.47 Ramos’s
shot hit Aldrete-Davila in his buttocks.48 Aldrete-Davila managed
to cross the Rio Grande into Mexico, where he was picked up by
unidentified individuals and taken to a medical facility.49
Compean and another agent picked up some of the shell casings
that Compean had fired and threw them into a water-filled ditch.50
Neither Ramos nor Compean reported the shooting, nor did any
other agent or supervisor on the scene that day.51
Through family relationships between Aldrete-Davila and a
Border Patrol agent, the shooting came to the attention of the
Department of Homeland Security.52 A special investigator looked
into the incident and eventually arrested Ramos and Compean.53
Aldrete-Davila was granted immunity in return for testifying.54 The
U.S. Attorney charged the agents with twelve counts, including
assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, denial of constitutional rights, and discharge of a firearm
in commission of a crime of violence under § 924(c).55 The agents
were found guilty of all counts except assault with intent to commit
murder.56 Ramos was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment, and
Compean was sentenced to twelve years—ten years of each
sentence due to the § 924(c) charge.57
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Ramos and Compean unsuccessfully argued that § 924(c) cannot apply to law enforcement officers
because they do not have fair warning that it applies to their on46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 445-46.
52. Id. at 443-44. Aldrete-Davila’s mother knew the mother-in-law of an agent in Arizona.
6 Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 228-30. That agent could not find a record of the
shooting and referred the incident to the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 236-37.
53. Ramos, 537 F.3d at 446.
54. Id. at 444.
55. Id. at 443.
56. Id. at 446.
57. Id.
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duty actions.58 Though upholding the sentences, the court noted,
“We can surely debate whether there is an intuitive distinction
between a violent criminal or a drug trafficker using a gun during
the course of their trade and a police officer using a gun against a
fleeing felon; however, neither the statute nor the cases make such
a distinction.”59
B. Congressional and Public Reaction
The prosecution caused an uproar. One petition calling for
President Bush to pardon the agents garnered over 160,000
signatures.60 The head of the Border Patrol union warned that the
precedent set by the prosecution could endanger agents, because “if
[they] use [their] weapon[s] in self-defense, [they] too can be looking
at [ten] years in federal prison.”61 One congressman complained
that the agents were doing their jobs and were punished for it,
while the drug smuggler was treated like an innocent victim.62 One
senator was concerned that the prosecution “could have a chilling
effect” on Border Patrol agents carrying out their duties.63
In a letter to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, six congressmen
expressed concerns over the § 924(c) charge.64 They argued that
because the statute “historically [has] been used in violent crime
and drug trafficking cases ... it appears that its application in the
present case is unwarranted.”65 The letter recommended limiting
§ 924(c) charges against police officers to “heinous crimes, such as
58. Id. at 456.
59. Id. at 458.
60. See Jerry Seper, Petition Readied for Two Border Agents, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006,
at A3.
61. James Pinkerton, Sentences Upheld for Two Border Agents, HOUS. CHRON., July 29,
2008, at A1.
62. See Jerry Seper, Gonzales Asked To Probe Prosecution of Agents, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2006, at A3.
63. See id. The worry was expressed by Senator Dianne Feinstein from California. For
her efforts, Feinstein, though considered “a dangerous liberal” by conservatives, became “a
star in their eyes.” Edward Epstein, Right Hails Feinstein in Border Agent Flap, S.F. CHRON.,
July 22, 2007, at A1.
64. Press Release, Representative Walter B. Jones, House Members Join Jones To
Question Improper Charge Against U.S. Border Patrol Agents (Oct. 13, 2006), available at
http://jones.house.gov/release.cfm?id=455.
65. Id.
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sexual assaults, which are clearly outside the realm of official
duties.”66
Though this letter recognized that police can be charged under
the statute, some members of Congress seemed unaware that
§ 924(c) had been amended to explicitly allow the prosecution of
police officers.67 Ramos and Compean, having been charged with
using a firearm during a crime of violence, would not have been
exempt from any version of the statute; earlier versions provided an
exemption only when officers carried a firearm during a felony.
Not all reaction to the prosecution was negative. Some commentators praised the prosecution for going after “rogue” agents who
“failed to report the shooting, lied to investigators, tried to conceal
evidence and filed a false report.”68 Others complained that the two
agents were wrongly heralded as heroes.69
In the end, concern over the prosecution crossed party lines and
went beyond border states.70 A bill calling for a commutation of the
agents’ sentences, introduced by a Massachusetts Democrat, had

66. Id. The congressmen feared that the prosecution set “a dangerous precedent of
application to law enforcement officers trying to act within the scope of their official duties.”
Id.
67. See, e.g., Todd J. Gillman, Senators Decry Agents’ Sentence: Hearing Examines ’05
Border Shooting of Fleeing Drug Smuggler, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 18, 2007, at 1A
(“Lawmakers said the [Ramos and Compean] case will force them to ... clarify that [Congress]
never meant to apply the gun-enhanced sentencing rules to police and federal agents whose
jobs require them to carry weapons.”); Jerry Seper, Hill Letter Asks Bush To Review Jailed
Agents’ Case, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A3 (reporting on letter from congressmen
stating § 924(c) was not intended to apply to on-duty officers).
68. Editorial, Misrepresentation: In the Case of Two Rogue Border Patrol Agents, the
Truth Has Been Sacrificed to Unprincipled Lies, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 8, 2007, at 10.
69. See, e.g., Pamela Colloff, Badges of Dishonor, TEX. MONTHLY, Sept. 2007, at 150;
Andrew C. McCarthy, The Border-Patrol Two Deserve Jail, NAT’L REV., Jan. 29, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MTQ4OWJjZTNmODMwNzhlMzA2MzZhYzJmYWM
2NjBkYzI=; cf. Martin S. Pinales, Border Shooting Provides Window of Opportunity
Regarding Mandatory Minimums, 31 CHAMPION 4 (2007) (arguing that the focus should be
on the excessive mandatory minimums, not whether the agents are heroes).
70. Representative Bill Delahunt, a Democrat from Massachusetts, called the § 924(c)
charge “harsh and unnecessary.” See Press Release, Representative Ted Poe, Poe/Delahunt
Continue Calls for Justice for Border Agents Ramos and Compean—75 Members Make
Bipartisan Plea for Presidential Action (July 31, 2008), available at http://poe.house.gov/
news/Document Single.aspx?DocumentID=99219.
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eighty-one cosponsors.71 In one of his last acts in office, President
Bush commuted the agents’ sentences.72
III. PROPOSED CHANGE
In the aftermath of Ramos and Compean’s prosecution, members
of Congress and others advocated an exception from § 924(c) for
police officers. This Part proposes such an exemption. First, a
Michigan statute that exempts police officers from a firearm
sentencing enhancement is analyzed to provide useful guidance for
any proposed change to § 924(c). Next, this Note’s proposal is
outlined and applied to cases in which police were charged under
§ 924(c). Finally, recent congressional proposals to amend § 924(c)
are critiqued.
A. The Michigan Statute
Michigan has exempted police officers from an enhanced sentence
for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Though perhaps not unique among states, Michigan’s statute and
the history of its enactment are useful guides in the current debate
over § 924(c).73
In 1984, while investigating an armed robbery, Detroit police
officer Theodore LeClaire, off-duty and in plain clothes, saw a man
he believed to be involved in the robbery.74 LeClaire stopped the
man’s van and ordered him out of the car.75 An altercation ensued,
during which LeClaire pistol-whipped the suspect.76 LeClaire was

71. H.R. Con. Res. 267, 110th Cong. (2007). For other congressional actions, see H.R. Res.
563, 110th Cong. (2007) (granting a “Congressional Pardon”); H.R. Con. Res. 37, 110th Cong.
(2007) (“[e]xpressing the Sense of Congress” that the agents should be pardoned).
72. See Gillman & Isenses, supra note 1. For a critique of the commutation, see Editorial,
Politics of Pardons: Bush Mostly on Track but Errs on Border Agents, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 21, 2009, at 22A.
73. For a statute that tracks the original language of § 924(c), see NEB. REV. STAT. § 281205 (2007) (punishing the use or the unlawful possession of a firearm).
74. People v. LeClaire, 357 N.W.2d 925, 926 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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charged with felonious assault and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony.77
The trial court dismissed the charges because the firearm enhancement “wasn’t meant to cover police officers who are by order
required to carry a firearm.”78 Further, “it would be a violation of
rights to require [officers] to carry a weapon and then to accuse
them of a felony of carrying the weapon that they’re required to
carry in the first place.”79
The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no legislative
intent to exempt off-duty officers from the statute.80 The court
explained that it would not “change the meaning of that statute by
imposing [its] own notions or beliefs regarding its wisdom or
efficacy.”81
One year later, on June 27, 1985, Officer Jim Khoury responded
to reports of a fight.82 Two men were fighting and one, James
Hester, had a knife.83 What happened next was disputed at trial
between witnesses and Khoury. According to witness accounts,
Khoury approached Hester from behind, cocked his gun, touched
the gun to Hester’s temple, and fired when Hester attempted to
move away, killing him.84 On the other hand, Khoury testified that
he yelled at the men to stop fighting and drew his gun when he saw
that Hester had a knife.85 Khoury explained that Hester swung at
him, and although the knife missed, Hester’s wrist hit Khoury’s left
arm, causing the gun in Khoury’s other hand to accidentally fire.86
Khoury was convicted in a bench trial of manslaughter, death
from a firearm pointed intentionally but without malice, and like
LeClaire, possession of a firearm during the commission of a
77. Id. Under § 924(c), LeClaire would have been charged with the use of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 926-27.
81. Id. at 926.
82. People v. Khoury, 448 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d, 467 N.W.2d 810
(Mich. 1991).
83. Id.
84. Id. Witnesses testified that Hester was never aware of Khoury’s presence and held
the knife in a defensive position. Id. at 838.
85. Id. at 837. Khoury initially thought Hester was going to stab the other man. Id.
86. Id.
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felony.87 On appeal, Khoury argued that the charge of possession of
a firearm could not apply to him as an on-duty police officer.88 The
Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that because the
legislature had already granted police officers immunity from civil
liability, it could likewise grant immunity from criminal liability
but had not done so.89 Further, the court could think of “no public
policy consideration that would justify granting police officers
immunity from criminal prosecution for their criminal acts.”90
On December 5, 1990, the Michigan legislature passed a firearms
bill91 that contained a provision exempting police officers from
punishment under the statute used to prosecute LeClaire and
Khoury.92 The amended statute, which is currently in force,
generally punishes any person “who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit
a felony.”93 But it “does not apply to a law enforcement officer who
is authorized to carry a firearm while in the official performance of
his or her duties, and who is in the performance of those duties.”94
Four months after the statute was altered to exempt police
officers, the Michigan Supreme Court, on a motion for reconsideration, reversed Khoury’s conviction for possession of a firearm.95
The court explained that the “[l]egislature recently clarified the
meaning of the statute” by enacting the new exemption provision,
and thus had never intended the statute to apply to police officers.96

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 836.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
Id.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICH., JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, regular Sess., vol. 5, at 5911-12 (1990).
92. Act of Dec. 27, 1990, No. 321, § 750.227b, 1990 Mich. Pub. Acts 1813-14.
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227b (West 2004). Unlike § 924(c), there is no
requirement that the firearm be used “in furtherance” or “during and in relation to” the
underlying crime. See People v. Perry, 326 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227b.
95. People v. Khoury, 467 N.W.2d 810 (Mich. 1991) (order granting reconsideration in
part and denying in part).
96. Id. For a short summary of Khoury, see Ronald J. Bretz & Jack Van Coevering,
Annual Survey of Michigan Law June 1, 1990 - May 31, 1991: Criminal Law, 38 WAYNE L.
REV. 803, 824-25 (1992).
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B. The Proposed Amendment to § 924(c)
This Note proposes § 924(c) be amended to provide an exemption
similar to that in Michigan. Section 924(c) should be amended to
exempt:
(a) a law enforcement officer,
(b) who is qualified to carry the firearm when the crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime occurs, and
(c) is acting in the performance of his duties when the crime is
committed.
The proposed exemption to § 924(c) has three elements which
must be met for it to apply. These elements are addressed below,
and cases of officers charged under § 924(c) are provided to
illustrate how the exemption would apply.
1. Law Enforcement Officer
The exemption would only apply to a law enforcement officer. A
definition of “law enforcement officer” is provided in 5 U.S.C.
§ 8401(17), which includes a person whose duties are primarily “the
investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected
or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United
States.”97 Such a definition for purposes of § 924(c) would be
expanded to include those investigating violations of state law.
Michigan’s exemption does not include private security guards,98
and neither would the proposed § 924(c).99
2. Qualified To Carry the Firearm When the Crime Is
Committed
The second requirement is that the officer is qualified to carry the
firearm at the time he commits the crime of violence or drug
97. 5 U.S.C. § 8401(17) (2006).
98. See People v. Calhoun, No. 195493, 1997 WL 33350516, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 30,
1997).
99. Blackwater guards working in Iraq for the State Department would also be denied
the exemption. Five guards were recently charged under § 924(c) for conduct while working
in Iraq. See News Release, Department of Justice, Transcript of Blackwater Press Conference
(Dec. 8, 2008), available at 2008 WL 5125947, at *8.
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trafficking crime. This requirement would be in dispute when the
police officer commits a crime while off-duty.
In numerous jurisdictions, off-duty police officers are required to
carry their firearms.100 Some jurisdictions allow off-duty officers to
assume their law enforcement role when an offense has been
committed in their presence.101 In Chicago, for example, roughly a
quarter of police shootings each year are by off-duty officers.102
It would not make sense to limit the proposed § 924(c) to only
those officers officially “on the clock.” As one writer explained, if a
police officer is required to combat crime at all times, he should also
be permitted to have the “tools of his trade.”103
Under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, qualified state and local police officers
may carry a concealed firearm while off-duty.104 The statute
requires the officer to carry proper identification as a police officer,
and he must be authorized by his police department to carry the
firearm.105
An off-duty officer carrying a concealed weapon as privileged
under the federal statute presents a different case than the typical
armed off-duty officer. The officer is not “forced” to be armed at all
times, as in some jurisdictions, but rather has chosen to carry a
concealed weapon. If the officer is expected to intervene in a crime
he sees take place, however, he may need to use that weapon to
perform his duties.
This Note’s proposal should extend to an off-duty officer carrying
a concealed weapon under the federal statute. The federal government preempted state firearm laws concerning off-duty police
100. In 1978, twenty-four of forty-nine large police departments required their officers
to carry guns while off-duty. James J. Fyfe, Always Prepared: Police Off-Duty Guns, 452
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 73 (1980). For arguments over whether to disarm offduty officers, compare Jay Gerald Safer, Deadly Weapons in the Hands of Police Officers, On
Duty and Off Duty, 49 J. URB. L. 565, 574-79 (1971) (arguing against disarmament), with
Fyfe, supra, at 80-81 (arguing in favor).
101. See Nick Madigan, The Dilemma of Being Armed and Off Duty: Baltimore Officer’s
Death Stirs Debate on Police Weapon Policy, BALT. SUN, Apr. 26, 2008, at A1.
102. Id.
103. Safer, supra note 100, at 579.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 926B (2006); see also id. § 926C (permitting retired police officers to carry
a concealed firearm). Private property and state and local government property are exempt.
Id. § 926.
105. Id. § 926B(a), (c)-(d).
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officers, restraining the states’ ability to regulate whether those
officers may carry concealed weapons. In return, the federal
government should forfeit the right to prosecute an off-duty officer
under § 924(c) after he engages in conduct with a concealed weapon
that violates § 924(c).
3. Acting in the Performance of His Duties
The third requirement, that the officer acts in the performance
of his duties, is the most likely of the three to be disputed.
One approach would be to declare that as soon as the officer
commits the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,
he is no longer acting in the performance of his duties. In other
words, “because an officer has no duty to take illegal action, he is
not engaged in his ‘duties’ ... if his conduct is unlawful.106 This
approach would render an exemption to § 924(c) meaningless,
because the statute is only implicated after an officer commits an
illegal act. Officer Khoury, for example, would not have been
exempt from Michigan’s statute if this approach had been adopted.
A better approach would be to determine whether the officer was
performing a law enforcement task. As one court explained, the test
is whether the officer is “acting within the scope of what the
[officer] is employed to do” or “is engaging in a personal frolic of his
own.”107 This approach comports with Michigan’s exemption, which
includes conduct like that of Officer Khoury but does not exempt an
officer involved in a “[p]urely personal confrontation.”108 Cases in
which police officers were charged under § 924(c) are provided
below to illustrate this standard.
An important note must be made about the example cases and
even Ramos and Compean’s prosecution. An exemption from
§ 924(c) would not result in no punishment for the officer; he could
still be guilty of assault, drug trafficking, denial of constitutional
rights, or other crimes. Rather, the officer would be exempt from
punishment for the involvement of his firearm. To demonstrate this
106. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1176 (Cal. 1990).
107. United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967).
108. People v. Carmona, No. 266228, 2007 WL 750415, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2007).
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point, the cases below identify when the officers were charged with
other crimes, including denial of constitutional rights under 18
U.S.C. § 242.109
a. Crimes of Violence
The following cases involve an underlying crime of violence.110 In
such situations, officers will often be acting in the performance of
their duties and thus be exempt from the statute.
i. Conduct That Would Fall Under the Exemption
Ramos’s and Compean’s conduct would fall under the exemption,
as they were in the pursuit of a suspect when they committed their
crimes of violence. The following cases would also fall under the
exemption.
Officer Williams
A case factually similar to Ramos’s and Compean’s altercation
with Aldrete-Davila is the prosecution of Officer John Williams.
After Williams stopped Adam Hall’s car for a traffic violation, the
two men engaged in a struggle, resulting in Hall fleeing in his
vehicle after Williams sprayed him with mace.111 A high speed
chase ensued, engaging three other officers.112 The officers eventually fired upon Hall’s vehicle, puncturing a tire and forcing Hall to
flee on foot.113 After he was intercepted and stopped by a police car,
109. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
110. For additional cases involving crimes of violence, see United States v. Acosta, 470
F.3d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Chinnery, No. 03-1299, 2003 WL 21469342, at
*8 (3d Cir. June 26, 2003); United States v. Bates, Nos. 01-2893, 01-2894, 01-3023, 2002 WL
31027879, at *1 (3d Cir. June 12, 2002); United States v. Epley, 52 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Parker, 25 F.3d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Warme, No.
09CR19A, 2009 WL 2713943, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2009); Pickard v. United States, 312
F. Supp. 2d 735, 739 (D. V.I. 2004) (motion to vacate from defendant in Bates); United States
v. Melendez, No. 03-80598, 2004 WL 162937, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2004); United States
v. Francies, No. 01 C 0109, 2002 WL 31415496, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2002); United States
v. Harloff, 807 F. Supp. 270, 271-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Michael Perlstein, Ex-Officer Sentenced
in Bank Heist Plan, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Mar. 17, 2005, at 1.
111. United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 2003).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 430.
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Hall raised his hands above his head.114 Williams, who was chasing
Hall on foot, took another officer’s firearm and shot Hall in the
upper back.115 Williams was charged and convicted under § 242 and
§ 924(c), and sentenced to a year and a half imprisonment on the
§ 242 charge and a consecutive ten-year sentence on the § 924(c)
charge.116
Officer Aguilar
After Officer Jimmy Aguilar arrested a suspect and was bringing
him to his police car, the suspect head-butted him.117 The two men
fought, during which Aguilar dropped his knee into the suspect’s
face and choked him, all while the suspect was handcuffed.118 One
fellow officer testified that Aguilar, after finally subduing the
suspect, placed his gun in the suspect's mouth and twisted it in a
threatening manner.119 Aguilar was charged under § 242 and
§ 924(c) but was convicted only under § 242 and sentenced to five
years imprisonment.120
Officer Winters
Larry Floyd, a prisoner in Mississippi, disguised himself as a
woman and successfully escaped from prison.121 After stealing a car
and crashing into a ditch, he was eventually apprehended by prison
guards.122 While in a vehicle and being transported back to prison,
Terry Winters, a prison officer, straddled Floyd and struck him on
his head with his gun, causing profuse bleeding.123 Winters was
114. Id. Williams claimed that Hall had grabbed something from his truck and while
running had turned to look at the chasing officers. This claim was not supported by the other
officers. Id.
115. Id. Williams later told his superior that he shot Hall because “he was tired of chasing
[Hall] and tired of fooling with [Hall].” Id. The victim recovered from the gunshot wound. Id.
116. Id. at 429, 431.
117. United States v. Aguilar, No. 05-51433, 2007 WL 2693460, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 13,
2007).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
122. Id.
123. Id. Under the “‘code of conduct’ for guards and other custodial personnel in the
Mississippi prison system ... the brutalizing of recaptured escapees was condoned if not
encouraged.” Id. at 206. But cf. United States v. McGill, 952 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1991). In
McGill, a prison guard shot dead an inmate while reenacting the Russian Roulette scene
from the film The Deerhunter, including crying “mau, mau” prior to pulling the trigger. Id.
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charged and convicted under § 242 and § 924(c),124 and sentenced to
six years imprisonment, five of those years due to the § 924(c)
charge.125
Officers Williams, Aguilar, and Winters would all fall under the
exemption as they were acting in the performance of their duties
when their crimes of violence were committed. These duties include
apprehending a suspect, escorting a suspect to a police car, and
transporting a suspect to jail.
ii. Conduct That May Fall Under the Exemption
The following two cases involve conduct that may fall under the
exemption; it is unclear whether the conduct was sufficiently tied
to the officers’ duties.
Officers Brown and Troxel
Around 9:00 p.m. Tab Wilhoit parked his delivery truck and
decided to take a nap.126 He was awoken by a man who had poked
his head through the truck’s window and asked for money, which
Wilhoit gave him hoping that the man would leave.127
Off-duty officers David Brown and Bruce Troxel, both drinking
at a nearby strip club, were informed that there was drug activity
outside.128 A man outside admitted selling drugs, pointed to
Wilhoit’s truck, and explained that he received a few dollars from
the driver.129 The officers asked Wilhoit to exit the truck, but he
refused, fearful he was being robbed.130 After Troxel showed his
at 17-18. Though the conduct occurred in 1984, when police were exempt from § 924(c) for
carrying a firearm, the defendant could have been charged with using a firearm, but he was
only charged under § 242. See id. at 17.
124. Winters, 105 F.3d at 203. But cf. United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1296
(11th Cir. 2005) (officer who pistol-whipped arrestee charged under § 242 but not § 924(c)).
125. Winters, 105 F.3d at 203. After deliberating for seven and a half hours, the jury
informed the judge that it was unable to reach a verdict. The judge informed the jury that
failure to agree on a verdict would result in the case being tried again. The jury returned a
guilty verdict thirty minutes later. Id. at 203-04.
126. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 582-83.
128. Id at 583. Brown worked at the strip club as a bouncer, but he was not working the
night of the incident. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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badge and Wilhoit continued to refuse to open the door, Troxel
reached inside the window and began to choke Wilhoit, attempting
to pull him outside the truck.131 Wilhoit responded by stabbing
Troxel in the arm with a pocket knife.132 Brown was wearing a
police jumpsuit and showed Wilhoit the word “Police” on the back
of it, and pointed his gun at him.133 Wilhoit then exited the vehicle,
and the officers hit him repeatedly, put their guns to his head, and
threatened to kill him if he told anyone about the incident.134
Brown and Troxel were charged and convicted under § 242 and
§ 924(c).135 On the § 242 charge, Brown was sentenced to five years
and ten months imprisonment, while Troxel was sentenced to five
years and three months.136 Both received a consecutive five-year
sentence under § 924(c).137
It would appear the two off-duty officers were in the performance
of their duties, as the appellate court mentioned that the officers
failed to file a report of the incident, which is required “when an
officer injures a civilian in the course of his duties or is injured
himself.”138 Arguably the conduct went beyond the officers’ duties,
however, when after the altercation the officers threatened to kill
Wilhoit and never attempted to make an arrest.
Officers Acosta and Skinner
After an extensive investigation by the FBI, nine detectives from
the Buffalo police department were charged with taking bribes,
stealing from drug dealers, and filing false search warrants.139 Only
two of the detectives were convicted of violating § 924(c),140 with one
131. Id. The window was open six to eight inches. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 584.
136. See Brief for Appellee, United States v. Brown, Nos. 00-2565, 00-3026, 250 F.3d 580
(7th Cir. 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/browntroxel.htm.
137. Id.
138. Brown, 250 F.3d at 586 (emphasis added).
139. See Michael Beebe & Dan Herbeck, Scapegoats in Blue?, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005,
at A1. But cf. United States v. DiLorenzo, No. S1 94 Cr. 303, 1995 WL 169003 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
10, 1995) (officer conducted illegal searches to steal drugs but was not charged under
§ 924(c)).
140. Beebe & Herbeck, supra note 139; see also United States v. Ferby, No. 00-CR-0053A,
2005 WL 1544802, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005) (detective from same investigation found
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officer sentenced to seven years and nine months imprisonment
and the other to forty-five years.141
Like in Ramos and Compean’s case, the § 924(c) charge sparked
controversy due to its mandatory sentence.142 One former detective
worried about the effect of charging police for carrying a gun, but
also cautioned that an officer “should never misuse the gun or the
badge.”143 The U.S. Attorney defended the charges, explaining that
this was not “a case of cops using their guns to carry out official
duties” but rather “to conduct illegal drug raids, breaking into
houses.”144
Despite the U.S. Attorney’s assertion, similar cases in which an
officer robbed or extorted a suspect while searching him would be
close calls because the charge is often robbery and extortion “under
color of official right.”145 This crime occurs when the officer uses his
position to illegally obtain money.146 Though one court described
such activity as “outside the scope of [the officer’s] authority,”147 it
is not clear that when the crime of violence is committed (the
robbery), the officer would be acting outside the performance of his
duties (conducting a search).
iii. Conduct That Would Fall Outside the Exemption
The following case illustrates conduct that would fall outside the
exemption.
Officer Juan Contreras sexually assaulted a woman after
stopping her vehicle and driving her to a remote area.148 A grand
jury returned an indictment for aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated sexual assault.149 After the indictment and before trial,
not guilty of violating § 924(c)).
141. United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2006).
142. Beebe & Herbeck, supra note 139.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. For a case in which an officer was charged with robbery under color of official right
but not § 924(c), see United States v. Pledge, No. 01-4624, 2002 WL 31689434, at *1 (4th Cir.
Dec. 3, 2002).
146. See United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 821 (2d Cir. 1990).
147. United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431, 467 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
148. United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1991).
149. Id. at 235.

2010]

EXEMPTING POLICE FROM 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

1631

Contreras hatched a plan to kill the victim to prevent her from
testifying, but the FBI prevented the plan’s success.150 A new
indictment was returned, including § 242 and § 924(c) charges for
both the sexual assault and the plan to kill the victim, for which
Contreras was found guilty151 and sentenced to sixty-one years
imprisonment.152
Clearly, Contreras was acting outside his duties when he drove
his victim to a secluded area to rape her, unlike cases in which the
officer is pursuing or searching a suspect. And unlike in Winters,
Contreras was not transporting his victim primarily for a legal
purpose. The plot to kill the victim was also clearly outside his
duties.
b. Drug Trafficking Crimes
The following cases involve an underlying crime of drug trafficking.153 Unlike officers charged with underlying crimes of violence,
those charged with drug trafficking almost never would fall within
the exemption from § 924(c).
i. Conduct That May Fall Under the Exemption
A case that may fall under the exemption is that of Officer Joy
Barber. Barber became romantically involved with a drug dealer,
eventually assisting his drug operation by warning him and his
150. Id. at 235-36.
151. Id. at 236; see also United States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 2006)
(concerning an officer charged under § 924(c) for rape).
152. United States v. Contreras, 134 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
153. For additional drug trafficking cases, see United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d
29, 38 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Gonzales, 528 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 121 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. King, Nos. 064683, 06-4724, 2008 WL 731112, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2008); United States v. Vazquez
Guadalupe, 407 F.3d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Villafane-Jimenez, 410 F.3d
74, 78 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2005);
United States v. Patterson, 348 F.3d 218, 221 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Novaton, 271
F.3d 968, 983 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1997); United States v. Green, No. 94-60139, 1995 WL 413129, at *1 (5th Cir. June 21, 1995);
United States v. Rivera, 889 F.2d 1029, 1030 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Warme, No.
09CR19A, 2009 WL 2713943, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2009); Rob Modic, Ex-Officer Guilty
on Arms Count, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, at B1.
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acquaintances of law enforcement investigations.154 At one point,
Barber engaged in a traffic stop of a drug dealer who was a rival of
her drug-dealing friends and harassed him for allegedly stealing
from them.155 Barber was charged with drug trafficking and § 924(c)
but was acquitted of the § 924(c) charge.156 Barber was sentenced to
twelve years and seven months imprisonment.157
Officer Barber was arguably in the performance of her duties
when she stopped the drug dealer’s car, even if she had ulterior
motives. She had full authority to conduct the stop, and therefore
may fall under the exemption.158
ii. Conduct That Would Fall Outside the Exemption
Barber is an outlier because most drug trafficking cases would
clearly fall outside the exemption. Such a case is provided as an
example.
Officer John Radcliff became involved in a drug conspiracy with
members of his wife’s family which involved selling methamphetamine.159 Radcliff was charged and convicted of violating drug
trafficking laws and § 924(c) for an occasion in which he escorted,
while in his police vehicle and in uniform with his firearm, a car
driven by his wife that contained drugs.160 Radcliff was sentenced

154. United States v. Barber, No. 93-5678, 1994 WL 406547, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 1994).
155. Id.
156. Id. Despite her acquittal, Barber was assigned a two-point sentencing enhancement
for possession of a weapon. Id. at *4.
157. Id. at *1.
158. Cf. United States v. Muxlow, 759 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (allowing officer
who stopped a vehicle to seize cocaine for a drug organization to plead guilty to drug charges
and not § 924(c)).
159. United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 2003).
160. Id. at 1157. But cf. United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2004)
(involving officer who escorted drugs in police car but was not charged under § 924(c)); Press
Release, U.S. Attorney for the N. Dist. of Ill., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fifteen South Suburban
Law Enforcement Officers Among 17 Defendants Charged in FBI Undercover Probe for
Allegedly Providing Armed Security for Purported Large-Scale Drug Deals (Dec. 2, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1202_01.pdf (providing that
officers who provided armed escorts not charged under § 924(c)).
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to nineteen years imprisonment, which included a five-year
sentence under § 924(c).161
Officer Radcliff was clearly acting outside his duties when he
engaged in drug trafficking, as is the case in the vast majority of
similar situations. This is contrasted to those officers making
arrests or stopping a vehicle, as escorting drugs is wholly outside an
officer’s duties. Therefore, the exemption’s third requirement, that
the officer have acted in the performance of his duties, would
include more cases of crimes of violence than drug trafficking
crimes.
C. Recent Congressional Proposals
In the wake of Ramos and Compean’s prosecution, members of
Congress introduced proposals to amend § 924(c). These are
inadequate, as they are either too narrow or too broad.
One congressional proposal would amend § 924(c) by providing an
exemption for on-duty officers who commit a crime of violence
during or in relation to the pursuit or apprehension of a criminal.162
This proposal has shades of the common law “fleeing felon rule,”
which authorized an officer’s use of deadly force to prevent a
suspected felon’s escape.163
This exemption is too narrow because it only applies to on-duty
police officers. This “on-the-clock” view ignores the fact that many
jurisdictions require police to be armed at all times, and many offduty police are expected to intervene when they see a crime take
place.164
A second proposal exempts anyone who is authorized to carry a
firearm for their employment and commits a crime of violence
161. See Mike McPhee, Ouray Deputy Convicted in Drug Ring Kills Self, DENV. POST, Jan.
6, 2002, at B2. A fellow officer, LeRoy Todd, was also convicted of drug trafficking and
§ 924(c) for various events, including one occasion during which he allowed, in exchange for
sex, a drug kingpin’s girlfriend to remove drugs from a trailer prior to a search. Id. Hours
before Todd was scheduled to be moved to federal prison, he hung and killed himself. Id.
162. See H.R. Res. 6367, 110th Cong. (2008).
163. BRUCE A. ARRIGO, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 9 (2000). This rule was
modified in a 1985 Supreme Court decision that limited the use of force. See id. (discussing
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
164. See supra Part III.B.2.
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during or in relation to that employment.165 This exemption is too
broad, as it extends beyond police officers to include security guards
and bounty hunters, who neither assume the same degree of risk,
nor acquire the same degree of training, as police.166 “During” the
employment is also overly broad as a “personal frolic” would be
included so long as the person is on the clock.
IV. WHY POLICE SHOULD RECEIVE AN EXEMPTION
Under this Note’s proposal, some police officers would receive a
protective shield from the statute that is denied to the average
citizen. This shield is justified because police are required to be
armed and must at times use force while in the performance of their
duties. Additional criminal penalties are also available against
police officers that are not applicable to ordinary citizens.
A. Police/Criminal Distinction
Congress enacted § 924(c) to target criminals who used or carried
guns while committing crimes. Most police officers are required to
be armed and do not have the choice the criminal has—to leave the
gun at home. The firearm is so integral to the uniform of a police
officer that § 924(c) convictions have been upheld on the premise
that when a drug dealer hires an officer to escort drugs, the gun
necessarily comes with the officer.167 For many officers, their
firearm is the “primary symbol of law enforcement.”168 Imposing
criminal liability on the premise that the defendant should not have
had the gun in the first place does not make sense when applied to
police officers.169
165. See H.R. Res. 3436, 110th Cong. (2007).
166. See, e.g., Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of
Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 731, 765-68
(1996) (comparing bounty hunters and police officers). This Note’s proposed definition of “law
enforcement officer” would exclude these problematic groups.
167. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 209.
168. PETER SCHARF & ARNOLD BINDER, THE BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE 32 (1983).
169. For a parallel example, imagine applying a four-point increase in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to an officer for crimes committed while in the performance of his
duties while wearing body armor. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.5 (2007).
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B. Police Must Use Force
Police are required to use force in the line of duty.170 When
making an arrest, officers are allowed to use an amount of force
that is reasonably necessary, as determined ex post by a court.171
Reasonableness is determined based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest.172 This standard of “reasonableness”
has been criticized as not providing adequate guidance to officers
regarding the amount of force they may use.173
When police use violence, it is often “a messy matter with
uncertain dimensions.”174 In shootings, police use their weapons in
“an individualized response to an immediate, particular, and always
peculiar situation.”175 In violent encounters between police and
citizens, there is “some or substantial, though perhaps unwitting,
contribution on the part of the citizen” for the outbreak of
violence.176
Such academic descriptions of the violent encounter between
police and citizens are grounded in reality. From 2003 to 2005,
police killed 1,095 people during arrest.177 Ninety-six percent of the
The statute authorizing the sentencing enhancement lists examples of officers killed by
criminals wearing body armor and asserts that officers’ lives could be spared if more armor
were issued to them. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796ll-3 (2006). Congress did not intend to encourage
officers to “leave their body armor at home.” The enhancement has been applied to officers
acting outside the scope of their duties in drug trafficking cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2009).
170. See, e.g., Peter K. Manning, Violence and the Police Role, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 135, 136 (1980) (“[P]olice represent the power and authority of the state and thus
must be violent.”).
171. See JOHN C. KLOTTER, LEGAL GUIDE FOR POLICE: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 83-84 (6th
ed. 2002); DENNIS M. PAYNE, POLICE LIABILITY: LAWSUITS AGAINST THE POLICE 11 (2002)
(“[U]se only that force necessary to overcome the resistance offered by the arrestee.”).
172. KLOTTER, supra note 171, at 86 (discussing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
173. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1119, 1143-44 (2008).
174. Manning, supra note 170, at 138.
175. John Van Maanen, Beyond Account: The Personal Impact of Police Shootings, 452
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 146 (1980).
176. Arnold Binder & Peter Scharf, The Violent Police-Citizen Encounter, 452 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 112, 115-16 (1980). Dennis Payne cites a study that found the best
predictor of an officer’s use of force was the use of force by the suspect. See PAYNE, supra note
171, at 172.
177. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ARREST-RELATED DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003-2005, at 3 (2007).
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victims were killed by the officer’s firearm, and three quarters were
being arrested for a violent crime.178 In the same period, 380 officers
were killed in the line of duty.179
Because of this uncertainty and fluidity when police use violence,
developing controls on the use of that violence is particularly
difficult.180 Coupled with the vague “reasonableness” standard
under which courts evaluate police action, officers face a regime in
which “unreasonable” force in a “messy matter” can lead to between
five and ten years in federal prison due to their firearms’ involvement in the crime.
With these facts in mind, an exemption from § 924(c) is justified.
Officers often must make quick decisions on whether to use force in
situations that are hazy at best. Ordinary criminals, on the other
hand, have the luxury of not placing themselves in such volatile
situations in the first place. Imposing a harsh penalty upon police
officers, on top of the underlying crime, is unfair in such a context.
Admittedly, this justification applies with greater force to underlying crimes or violence, but as demonstrated above these are the
situations most likely to fall under the exemption.
C. Alternate Liabilities for Police
Certain federal criminal statutes are applicable when a police
officer commits a crime that are not applicable against private
citizens.181 Section 242 provides for criminal prosecution when,
under the color of law, one deprives another of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.”182 The standard maximum sentence
under the statute is one year in prison, although if the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon occurred,
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 3. Of those, 221 officers were killed accidentally. Id.
180. See Manning, supra note 170, at 139.
181. Police officers are also subject to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute
provides a remedy only when the officer is acting under a state law. See Soldevila v. Sec’y of
Agric. of the U.S., 512 F.2d 427, 429 (1st Cir. 1975); see also MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 5:2 (3d ed. 2004) (Bivens actions); VICTOR E. KAPPELER,
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 40 (2d ed. 1997) (success rates of § 1983 claims).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
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the defendant may be sentenced up to ten years in prison.183 The
government must prove that the defendant acted wilfully to deprive
the victim of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or a statute.184
Also, the officer must have had “fair warning” that his conduct
would be proscribed by the statute.185
An officer must have acted under the color of law to be successfully prosecuted under § 242. The statute covers an officer’s acts
while in the performance of his duties, including when he is off-duty
so long as he acts pursuant to his authority.186 Police officers have
been found to violate § 242 even in personal situations, so long as
“an air of official authority” existed, for example by displaying a
badge or accessing a restricted area to which only officers have
access.187
Applying § 242 to police officers has advantages over § 924(c).
Unlike § 924(c), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence,
the judge has discretion under § 242 when sentencing the defendant. Additionally, there is no requirement that the sentence under
§ 242 be served consecutively. This lessens the harsh impact from
sentencing when an officer uses unreasonable force.
To address this harsh impact of § 924(c), the statute could be
altered to exempt officers from the mandatory minimum sentence,
rather than punishment under the statute generally, allowing
judges to determine the appropriate sentence under the statute. An
exemption is preferred to such an approach. The purpose of § 924(c),
to encourage criminals to “leave their guns at home,”188 does not
make sense when applied to police officers regardless of the length
of the prison sentence.
Some commentators have argued that § 242 is underutilized due
to the requirement of wilful action by the officer and concerns over

183. Id. Whether § 242 should be amended to remove the penalty for the firearms’
involvement is beyond the scope of this Note.
184. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951).
185. See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal
Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2211 (2003).
186. See United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744, 750-52 (7th Cir. 2003); see also AVERY
ET AL., supra note 181, § 1:2 (analyzing the analogous civil statute).
187. United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing cases).
188. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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federalism.189 Although the Justice Department has a nearly 100
percent success rate in prosecuting civil rights cases such as hate
crimes, prosecutions for official misconduct, including police
brutality, have success rates in the 60 to 70 percent range.190
Explanations for the low rate of § 242 prosecutions include inadequate resources, lack of interest by prosecutors, and the general
difficulty in prosecuting police officers.191 Because the federal
government prosecutes local police officers only when the local
authority fails to do so,192 low numbers of federal prosecutions are
only a problem if local prosecutors refuse to prosecute legitimate
cases and the federal government fails to fill the void.
As noted above, the majority of situations in which an officer
would be exempt under this Note’s proposed § 924(c) are those with
underlying crimes of violence. In all but two of such cases cited in
this Note, prosecutors brought § 242 charges as well.193 It does not
appear that federal prosecutors are reluctant to charge § 242 in the
context of cases in which § 924(c) is also charged.
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALTERING § 924(c)
This Part analyzes arguments against altering § 924(c). First, one
argument asserts that § 924(c) already contains adequate
protections for police officers, and thus no need to amend it exists.
Second, some argue that jurors may already give officers the benefit
of the doubt. As a result, jurors may be reluctant to convict an
officer under § 924(c) unless the conduct is particularly egregious.
Third, some take the position that U.S. Attorneys, who have
189. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 466-67 (2004) (noting that because § 242 permits prosecution for
“ordinary torts and crimes,” federalism concerns “may lead prosecutors to err on the side of
underenforcement”).
190. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1998).
191. See id. at 90; see also Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring
Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 501-03 (2008).
192. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 190, at 89.
193. See United States v. Parker, 25 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving an officer who
drove a getaway car for a bank robbery); United States v. Francies, No. 01 C 0109, 2002 WL
31415496 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2002) (involving an officer who robbed drug dealers).
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discretion over whether to charge § 924(c), will not file § 924(c)
charges unless an officer’s conduct was so beyond the pale as to
warrant the mandatory minimum. Finally, if police officers believe
they are “above the law,” granting an exemption may only further
this view and lead to more rogue officers. Though these arguments
may have merit, they are not sufficient to overcome the justifications to amend § 924(c).
A. Statutory Protections Already in Place
Under § 924(c), the firearm must be used or carried “during and
in relation to” the underlying crime, or possessed “in furtherance”
of the crime.194 Simply having the weapon on your person is not
sufficient. In fact, one of the factors that courts consider when
determining whether a gun was possessed “in furtherance” of the
underlying crime is the legality of the possession.195 An argument
may be made that § 924(c) contains adequate safeguards against
unjust application to police officers who are on-duty and performing
their duties.
When an officer commits an underlying drug trafficking crime,
the statutory language does provide sufficient protection; such
protection is lacking when the underlying crime is a crime of
violence.
1. Drug Trafficking Crimes
In drug trafficking cases, courts and juries consider an officer’s
on-duty status and his activities when determining guilt under §
924(c). The following cases illustrate this point.
Officer Russell
Officer Garrett Russell sold drugs to a government informant on
three occasions.196 Two of the sales occurred while Russell was onduty, in his police cruiser, wearing his uniform and his firearm.197
194.
195.
196.
197.

For an explanation of these standards, see supra Part I.B.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
United States v. Russell, 76 F.3d 808, 809-10 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id.
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The third occasion was while Russell was off-duty in his personal
car, on his way home from work, but still wearing his uniform and
firearm.198 In addition to drug trafficking charges, Russell was
charged under § 924(c) for each of the three sales, but was convicted
only for the sale while off-duty.199 Russell was sentenced to three
years and three months imprisonment on the drug counts and a
consecutive five-year sentence under § 924(c).200
Russell appealed his § 924(c) conviction, arguing that his off-duty
possession of the gun was incidental and due to his employment as
a police officer.201 The Sixth Circuit disagreed and upheld the
conviction.202
The jury presumably determined that Russell’s firearm was not
present “in furtherance” of his drug crimes while he was on-duty,
but it was when he was off-duty. This distinction reveals that the
jury ensured that the presence of the weapon did not trigger an
automatic § 924(c) conviction and the on-duty status of the officer
was considered by the jury.
Officers Moore, Ramos, Young, and Jackson
In Chicago, an undercover officer and the defendant police
officers agreed that the defendants would escort drug couriers
around the city for the undercover officer’s mock drug operation.203
If the couriers were pulled over, the defendants were to show their
police badges and prevent a search of the courier’s car.204 The
defendants were charged and convicted of drug trafficking and
§ 924(c).205 The officers received sentences ranging from 9 years to
115 years, primarily due to multiple consecutive sentences under
§ 924(c).206
198. Id. at 810.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 810-11 & nn.5-6.
202. Id. at 812 (“[A] reasonable juror could conclude that Russell used and/or carried the
firearm ... to protect the [drugs] and facilitate [their] sale.”).
203. United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2004).
204. Id. at 635.
205. Id. at 634, 639; cf. United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 416-17 (5th Cir. 2003)
(involving officer acquitted of § 924(c) charges for escorting drug dealers).
206. See Steve Warmbir, Leader of Austin 7 Cops Gets 115 Yrs., CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 19,
2001, at 14.
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On appeal, the defendants argued that the presence of the
firearms was coincidental because, as police officers, they were
required to carry their weapons.207 One of the officers argued that
he was only instructed to show his badge, and thus never intended
to use his gun.208 The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments
because the officers were “hired to play the role of a police officer,
which necessarily entails carrying a service revolver.”209 The court
made sure to point out that “we are not holding that any time a
police officer commits a drug trafficking offense or a crime of
violence while carrying his or her police weapon, the officer
automatically has violated § 924(c).”210
Courts and juries appear to scrutinize the degree to which the
firearm played a role in the drug trafficking crime. Although an
assumption may exist that the firearm was involved, such as the
assumption that the firearm comes with the officer, the connection
between the crime and the firearm is not automatic.
2. Crime of Violence
When the underlying crime is a crime of violence, jurors appear
to convict more easily on the § 924(c) charge. This is likely because
the firearm is directly involved in the crime by being brandished or
discharged.
There are exceptions. In Aguilar, Officer Aguilar was acquitted
of the § 924(c) charge.211 In that case, only one of the fellow officers
who was at the scene testified that Aguilar had placed his gun in
the suspect’s mouth,212 and the jury may not have believed the
testimony. This is more likely than the jury making a policy
decision that because Aguilar was on-duty, and the fight with the

207. Moore, 363 F.3d at 640.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 641.
210. Id. For another Seventh Circuit case that goes to lengths to tie the defendant police
officer’s firearm to the underlying drug trafficking crime, see United States v. Haynes, 582
F.3d 686, 701-05 (7th Cir. 2009).
211. See supra text accompanying note 120.
212. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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suspect occurred during an arrest, the firearm charge should not
apply.213
In Ramos and Compean’s case, the jury considered the fact that
the agents were on-duty at the time the conduct occurred. Ramos’s
attorney described speaking with jurors after the trial who told her
that the agents “were just out there doing their jobs, but they
shouldn’t have shot.”214 The agents were indicted for “discharge of
a firearm in commission of a crime of violence” under § 924(c).215
Once the jury determined that the agents had assaulted the drug
smuggler, conviction on the § 924(c) charge was almost automatic
because the evidence was not disputed that the agents had fired
their weapons.216
Jurors convict on § 924(c) more readily for crimes of violence and
scrutinize more closely for drug trafficking charges. The statutory
language of § 924(c) does provide adequate protection for officers
involved in drug offenses. For crimes of violence, a change in the
statute is necessary to ensure that a crime committed by an officer
in the performance of his duties is not the basis of a § 924(c) charge.
B. Jurors Believe Police
A second argument against altering § 924(c) makes the case that
police have an advantage in criminal prosecutions that ordinary
citizens lack: jurors may give more credibility and weight to the
testimony of police officers.217 Some argue police officers may
believe they have this advantage, lessening the hesitancy to shoot
213. This scenario can be compared to situations in which the officer is acquitted of the
underlying crime of violence and the § 924(c) charge. See, e.g., United States v. Chinnery, No.
03-1299, 2003 WL 21469342 (3d Cir. June 26, 2003).
214. 18 Trial Transcript, supra note 44, at 15-16.
215. 17 id. at 4.
216. The U.S. Attorney made this point, stating “[t]here seems little doubt ... that
Compean and Ramos used their firearms.” Hearing to Examine the Prosecution of Ignacio
Ramos and Jose Compean Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Johnny Sutton, U.S. Att’y), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=2872.
217. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 190, at 90. For a discussion of juries and civil
liability for police officers, see Armacost, supra note 189, at 468 (“[T]he tendency ... to favor
police officers over alleged victims of excessive force is reinforced by a widely held public view
that a little bit of police brutality is simply the price we pay for crime control.”).
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a suspect if an officer believes his life is in danger, preferring to
take his chances with a jury.218 Jurors may especially side with
police when they are charged with denial of a defendant’s rights.219
The jury in Ramos and Compean’s case was prominent in the
public debate following the conviction. The prosecuting U.S.
Attorney used the jury as a bulwark against congressional criticism.
He explained that the agents were clearly guilty because “West
Texas juries don’t convict cops easily.”220 Others countered that had
the jury been informed that Aldrete-Davila had brought another
load of drugs into the United States after receiving immunity and
while waiting to testify at the trial, the jury would not have
convicted the agents.221
In many cases, however, there are additional factors that may
have influenced the jury more than merely the defendant’s status
as a police officer. After Ramos and Compean’s trial, reports
surfaced that some jurors had convicted the agents against their
will. Three jurors stated that they were told by the foreman that the
verdict had to be unanimous and voted guilty because they were
outnumbered.222 Two jurors claimed that other jurors demanded a
quick verdict in order to be done with deliberations before spring
break.223 Of course, these statements may have been made in
reaction to the public outcry against their verdict, but they do
218. See William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 SOC. PROBS.
144, 147 (1984) (“‘I’d rather be judged by twelve than carried out by six’ is familiar to every
urban police officer.”).
219. See Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to
Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 59 (1987). But see
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 236-39 (1966) (arguing that jurors
acquit defendants who injure or kill an officer when the officer used excessive force during
an altercation).
220. Gillman, supra note 67.
221. See Seper, supra note 67. In other words, the jury was unable to properly assess
Aldrete-Davila’s credibility when he claimed that he was “a first-time offender trying to earn
money to pay for his mother’s medical bills.” James Pinkerton, Sentences Upheld for Two
Border Agents, HOUS. CHRON., July 29, 2008, at A1. Aldrete-Davila was eventually sentenced
to nine and a half years for smuggling drugs while awaiting Ramos and Compean’s trial. See
Jerry Seper, Drug Smuggler Shot by Border Agents Sentenced, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008,
at A3.
222. Jerry Seper, Border Agents Seek New Trial, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at A3.
223. Jerry Seper, Border Patrol Agents’ Conviction Riles Union Chief, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2006, at A3. For another illustration of an impatient jury, see supra note 125.
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illustrate that whether the defendant is a police officer is not so
overwhelmingly influential as to determine the jury’s verdict.224
Additionally, the argument that jurors believe police more than
they believe other witnesses is not a narrow criticism against an
exemption from § 924(c). Such a jury bias would affect decisions on
the underlying crime as well, such as assault or drug trafficking.
Juries may give police the benefit of the doubt, but a reliance on the
jury’s temperament provides a loose rule and weak predictability
for police officers.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
A third argument against altering § 924(c) assures that prosecutorial discretion prevents unnecessary application of § 924(c).
Because prosecutors choose which cases to bring to trial,225 an
exemption for police officers may be unnecessary. This argument
assumes that U.S. Attorneys only charge officers under § 924(c) if
their conduct was so egregious as to warrant the statutory minimum.
Prosecutorial discretion was discussed when § 924(c) was first
debated in Congress and concerns were raised over the proposed
language’s broad reach. The legislation’s sponsor attempted to blunt
criticism by noting, “[T]he U.S. attorney has the discretion of even
filing a case.”226
In Ramos and Compean’s case, the prosecutor became a major
focus of the public furor. U.S. Attorney Johnny Sutton was either
“Satan” who should be “thrown into the same jail cells as Ramos
and Compean,” or a tough-on-crime prosecutor from Texas doing his
job.227 Critics of the prosecution claimed Sutton “lied to the

224. The jurors’ remorse also may have occurred because jurors are generally not allowed
to know the potential prison sentences when determining guilt. See Rachel E. Barkow,
Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 79-80 (2003).
225. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES 13 (1978) (listing ways
U.S. Attorneys “wield awesome authority” in criminal cases).
226. 114 CONG. REC. 22,230 (1968) (statement of Rep. Casey).
227. Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Attorney Put on Defensive, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2007, at A8.
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American people” and “prosecuted the good guys and gave immunity to the bad guys.”228
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sutton
argued that, as a prosecutor, he had to charge law enforcement
officers when they broke the law.229 He invoked the cloak of
prosecutorial discretion, informing the committee that of the
fourteen other shootings by Border Patrol agents in El Paso over
the previous six years, no officers had been charged.230 Under
Justice Department policy, federal prosecutors “pursue the most
serious, readily-provable offense or offenses that are supported by
the facts of the case.”231 Charges made under § 924(c) are proper, he
argued, because Congress had not exempted police and § 924(c)
charges further the goal of reducing gun violence.232
Sutton’s reference to departmental policy about which charges to
pursue concerns a September 22, 2003 memorandum from Attorney
General John Ashcroft to federal prosecutors. The memorandum
stated, “The use of statutory enhancements is strongly encouraged,
and federal prosecutors must therefore take affirmative steps to
ensure that the increased penalties resulting from specific statutory
enhancements, such as ... the filing of a charge under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), are sought in all appropriate cases.”233 Federal prosecutors
can decline to bring charges under § 924(c) only with written
approval in exceptional cases.234 There is no mention of differing
standards when charging a police officer.
As noted earlier, prosecutors can easily prove the elements of
§ 924(c) for an officer who commits a crime of violence. If federal
prosecutors are “strongly encouraged” to bring charges under
§ 924(c) and the exceptions are limited and do not include police

228. Id. (quoting Rep. Dana Rohrabacher).
229. Hearing, supra note 216.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft to All Fed. Prosecutors Regarding Policy
on Charging of Criminal Defendants (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.
234. Id.
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officers, then it is unlikely that prosecutorial discretion is a valid
bulwark against criminal liability.235
Further, such reliance on prosecutors to use their discretion does
not provide adequate guidelines for officers to determine when they
might face criminal liability. The potential punishment is great, as
at a minimum the officer will be sentenced to five years in prison.236
Allowing prosecutors to determine their own standards for when an
officer should be prosecuted under § 924(c) provides too much
discretion for a statute with such harsh penalties.
This concern is validated by examining cases in which police
officers were not charged under § 924(c) for conduct similar to cases
in which charges were brought. The following three cases illustrate
the point.
1. Crime of Violence: Wrongful Shooting
At 5:30 a.m., seventy-two-year-old officer Adolph Bradley and his
partner observed a station wagon roll through a stop sign and
attempted to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation.237 The sixtyyear-old driver of the station wagon continued on, and, in what the
Seventh Circuit described as “something out of a ‘Dirty Harry’
movie,” Bradley leaned out of the passenger window of the police
vehicle and fired a warning shot into the air from his .357
Magnum.238 The station wagon continued driving at twenty-five
miles per hour, so Bradley fired into the vehicle, his hollow-point
bullet hitting a metal plate in the back of the driver’s seat.239 The
station wagon stopped, and Bradley followed his bullet with a
stream of expletives, shouting “get out of this car mother fucker
before I blow your God damned brains out!”240 The driver of the
station wagon then exited the vehicle, at which point he and

235. Although the Justice Department could change its policy, a statutory change is
preferable as it prevents fluctuations in policies with a new President or Attorney General.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(a)(1) (2006).
237. United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 1999).
238. Id.
239. Id. Bradley later claimed that he believed the driver reached for a gun, a claim his
partner contradicted. Id. at 769.
240. Id. at 766.
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Bradley recognized each other as boyhood friends, and no traffic
citation was issued.241
Bradley did not report the shooting, contrary to his police
department’s policy.242 The driver, despite the childhood friendship,
reported the incident to the FBI and Bradley was indicted and
convicted under § 242.243 Though facing up to five years in prison,
Bradley was sentenced to probation.244 This was perhaps because
Bradley had “a good reputation” and “strong ties with members of
the communities in which he worked.”245
Bradley could have been charged under § 924(c), with a ten-year
sentence for discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, as his
situation resembles that for which Ramos and Compean were
charged. In fact, Bradley’s conduct was more disturbing due to his
apparent intent to kill a motorist for running a stop sign.
2. Drug Trafficking: Escorting Drugs
Reynaldo Marmolejo, an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) agent, was convicted of drug trafficking and related charges
for transporting drugs from Mexico into the United States for a
drug cartel.246 The transports were made in INS vehicles, while
Marmolejo was carrying his service firearm.247 During sentencing,
the district court did not enhance Marmolejo’s sentence for his
possession of a firearm.248 Marmolejo was sentenced to nineteen
years and ten months imprisonment.249
The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence for failure to apply the
firearm enhancement.250 The court reasoned that, despite the fact
that Marmolejo was required to carry his firearm, using an armed
241. Id. at 765-66.
242. Id. at 766.
243. Id.
244. See Roy Malone, Former Longtime Police Officer in Brooklyn Who Shot at Motorist
Gets Three Years’ Probation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 1999, at 4. The sentence was
vacated and remanded by the Seventh Circuit. Bradley, 196 F.3d at 772.
245. Bradley, 196 F.3d at 765.
246. United States v. Marmolejo, 106 F.3d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997).
247. Id. at 1216.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1215.
250. Id.
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INS agent as an “armed guard to protect [the drugs]” was the
perfect cover for the drug cartel.251
A § 924(c) charge could have applied, similar to other cases in
which officers escorted drugs, either for carrying the firearm during
and in relation to the crime or possessing the firearm in furtherance
of the crime, both with a five-year sentence. Officer Radcliff was
sentenced to five years in prison, beyond the prison time for drug
charges, for escorting a drug shipment in a car driven by his wife;252
Agent Marmolejo escaped such punishment for nearly identical
conduct.
3. Acting Outside Official Duties: Personal Vendetta
Officer William Tarpley became aware of a past affair between
his wife and Kerry Vestal.253 With his wife’s aid, Tarpley arranged
for Vestal to come to his home, where Tarpley planned to assault
Vestal.254 When Vestal arrived, Tarpley began to beat him and
inserted his service firearm into Vestal’s mouth, threatening to kill
him.255 Tarpley was charged and convicted under § 242256 and
sentenced to two years and nine months imprisonment.257 Had
Tarpley been charged under § 924(c), he would have faced a fiveyear consecutive sentence for the use of a firearm during a crime of
violence.
Although Officer Aguilar was charged under § 924(c) for allegedly
placing a firearm in an arrestee’s mouth,258 Tarpley was not
similarly charged for equally, if not more, egregious conduct. As
illustrated by this cases and others, the consequences of leaving
§ 924(c) charges to prosecutorial discretion can be great. This is
especially troubling when two similar factual situations are
251. Id. at 1216.
252. See supra text accompanying note 160.
253. United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1991).
254. Id. at 807-08.
255. Id. at 808.
256. Id. Tarpley acted “under color of law” because he repeatedly referred to himself as
an officer and claimed he could kill and get away with it as an officer. Id. at 809.
257. See Brief of Appellee at 2-3, United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1991)
(No. 91-1043), 1991 WL 11245473.
258. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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presented and one officer faces a hefty mandatory minimum
consecutive sentence while the other does not.
D. Police Believe They Are Above the Law
A fourth argument against altering § 924(c) focuses on the
psychology of police officers. Police may have an attitude that they
are above the law.259 The profession attracts people who view
themselves as a moral force for good aligned against the forces
endangering ordinary citizens.260 This image of their role, some
suggest, accounts for “the most shocking abuses of police power.”261
If this is true, giving police officers an exemption from § 924(c) may
only add to the notion that the law does not apply to police to the
same extent it does to ordinary citizens.
It seems unlikely that an exemption from § 924(c) would result
in more violence by police officers. The consequences of using
unreasonable force include criminal liability under § 242 and, for
state law enforcement officers, civil liability.262 The officer would
almost surely lose his job if found guilty.263 Police also often suffer
various psychological problems after shootings.264
Additionally, it is wrong to make policy judgements assuming
that police officers believe the law does not apply to them. Such an
assumption could be a justification to forbid officers from carrying
firearms in the first place. It is unclear how many officers would be
tempted by an exemption in § 924(c) to act violently in violation of
the law, but evidence from Michigan indicates that the number is
not significant. Forty-five § 242 and § 241 (conspiracy) cases were

259. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 146 (1993).
260. Id. at 92.
261. Id. at 93.
262. See supra note 181. In Brown, the victim received a $475,000 settlement from the city
of Gary, Indiana. See Andy Grimm, Shooting Victim’s Father Files Suit, MERRILLVILLE POSTTRIB., May 16, 2006, at A1. For an analysis of officers’ fear of civil litigation, see KAPPELER,
supra note 181, at 6-7.
263. In one study of officers involved in shootings, 34 percent feared legal or administrative problems. See David Klinger, Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings, NAT’L
INST. OF JUST. J., Jan. 2006, at 21, 23.
264. See id. at 21-23; see also ARRIGO, supra note 163, at 97.
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referred to federal prosecutors in Michigan for fiscal year 1996.265
The two states closest to Michigan in population, Ohio and Georgia,
had eighty cases and seventy-one cases referred, respectively.266
VI. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Police officers face proper sanctions under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. For instance, an additional two points may be added for
the abuse of a position of public trust.267 Officers who assault a
suspect while the suspect is handcuffed face a two-point increase in
the Guidelines for physically restraining the victim in the course of
the crime.268
If officers are exempt from § 924(c), a problem may arise when an
officer is assigned an increase in the Guidelines for the firearm’s
role in the underlying crime. For example, aggravated assault
carries a base offense level of fourteen.269 If a firearm was discharged, the offense level increases by five; if a firearm was used,
the level is increased four levels; and if a firearm was brandished
or its use threatened, the level is increased by three.270 For drug
crimes, two levels are added for the possession of a firearm.271
The same justifications for the exemption from § 924(c) apply to
the Guidelines, although in a less compelling way. Although
§ 924(c) imposes a mandatory sentence, the Guidelines are advisory, and thus the stakes are lessened compared to a mandatory
minimum sentence.272
Currently, amending the Guidelines may not be necessary due to
their advisory nature. If courts or U.S. Attorneys were to prob265. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 190, at 386-87. For a case from Michigan, see
United States v. Melendez, No. 03-80598, 2004 WL 162937 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2004)
(eighteen Detroit officers charged under § 242 and § 924(c)).
266. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 190, at 385, 387.
267. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2007); see, e.g., United States v.
Parker, 25 F.3d 442, 449-50 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying two points to officer who drove his
police cruiser as a getaway car during a bank robbery).
268. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.3 (2007); see, e.g., United States v.
Evans, No. 95-5714, 1996 WL 233056 (4th Cir. May 8, 1996).
269. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2(a) (2007).
270. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(2). Note the parallels to the sentencing levels of § 924(c).
271. Id. § 2D1.11(b)(1).
272. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
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lematically apply enhancements subsequent to an altered § 924(c),
amending the Guidelines may become necessary to prevent
punishments obtained through the “back-door.”273
CONCLUSION
Police officers should be exempt from § 924(c) if certain conditions
are met. First, when the underlying crime is committed, the officer
must be authorized to carry the firearm either by the local law
enforcement agency or by federal statute. Second, the officer must
be acting in the performance of his duties. This exemption should
apply to both on- and off-duty officers because many police officers
are required to carry firearms even when off-duty. The exemption
is further justified because police officers confronted with violent
situations often have only moments to respond, and their actions
are reviewed afterward under a vague “reasonableness” standard.
An exemption from the statute would protect officers in such
situations, and would likely not apply to an officer who is engaged
in drug crimes. It bears repetition that officers would remain liable
for the underlying crime; the exemption only applies to the sentence
for the firearm’s involvement in the crime.
Ramos and Compean’s case placed this issue in the public
forefront despite prior prosecutions of law enforcement officers
under § 924(c). Congress has blamed prosecutors for being overzealous against police officers who were doing their jobs. Prosecutors,
in turn, have blamed Congress for imposing a mandatory minimum
sentence and not providing an exemption for police. It is time for
Congress to make explicit what apparently many believed was
implicit: the presence or use of a police officer’s firearm, which he
is authorized to carry, should not be the basis of a harsh sentence

273. See, e.g., United States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1992) (involving two
officers not charged under § 924(c) but given two-point enhancement); United States v. Ruiz,
905 F.2d 499, 507 (1st Cir. 1990) (giving a two-point enhancement to an officer not charged
under § 924(c)). But see United States v. Siebe, 58 F.3d 161, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacating
a two-point enhancement because it was applied on the premise that an officer who is issued
a firearm automatically carried that firearm during a drug crime). Officer Barber, discussed
above, was acquitted of § 924(c) charges but assigned a two-point enhancement. United
States v. Barber, No. 93-5678, 1994 WL 406547, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 1994).
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when the officer commits a crime while acting in the performance
of his duties.
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